In some instances departmental and enterprise
operations are compromised as a result of high level process flaws.
In such instances it is possible for the compromise to go unnoticed
for very long periods as, with all the computer systems working
as expected, the symptoms of the failures are subtle. To find such
flaws it is important to identify multiple and often abstract dimensions
that can be measured in isolation and collaboration in order to
provide the insight necessary.
Background
A major city council had
developed a bespoke application that managed every aspect
of their education department's operations. This involved
many modules including one that recorded details of allegations
made by pupils and staff about the behaviour of other pupils
and staff. This module recorded all aspects of allegations
about all forms of abuse and misconduct, whether minor or
major in nature.
The
Bichard Inquiry into the events that led to the murders
of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman (the Soham Murders) highlighted
the importance of such data and how such data should be
maintained to minimise a repeat of the circumstance that
ultimate led to the death of two innocent school girls.
Ian Huntly, the man convicted of the murders, had a string
of previous allegations, some of which were made whilst
he attended school and others whilst he worked at schools.
Clearly, had these have come to
notice of those who employed him at the school where he
was to meet his victims, it is likely that he would not
have been employed, and thus the murders prevented.
In the case of Ian Huntly, few of the allegations made against
him were ever proven, yet when viewed as a whole, the number
and nature of those allegations made would appear to infer
he had criminal tendencies, and if these had been presented
as a whole, both the police and potential employers may
have taken a different approach in their dealings with him.
Given this, one might be surprised to find that, in 2006,
2 years after the Bichard Inquiry, that a system designed
to record such data appeared to have records missing, i.e.
that somehow, someone had the ability to delete records
about allegations. Yet this is the case and highlights a
potential process flaw that allows such data loss to go
unnoticed and unrecorded.
Identification of Issue
The issue was identified
by RAS when conducting an audit of the data. Due to the
nature of this subject matter, RAS will not detail how this
finding was achieved, other than to say that it was an finding
confirmed and acknowledged by the council concerned.
Cause
The cause of this process
failure is likely to be nothing more than an oversight on
the part of the organisation concerned.
The causes for the records being
deleted are many and varied, ranging from application error
to deliberate human intervention. The motives behind deletion
of such data if it was a deliberate act could be completely
innocent, or extremely sinister. Either way, it would be
best that such data was never deleted and that all records
were regularly checked to prove they had not been tampered
with or deleted.
Implications to the Council
In the event that such data loss was at any stage to
be attributed as a cause of a serious incident, it is
clear that the council and senior council staff could
be held liable for both enabling such data to be lost
and for not knowing that such data was being deleted.
If the Council's policy was that such data could be deleted
it is likely that this policy would be amended to meet
the objectives inferred by the Bichard Inquiry.
If the Council's policy was that such data should never
be deleted, the fact that such data has been lost is evidence
that the applications used need immediate attention to prevent
future deletions. Furthermore, it is the evidence needed
to start an internal investigation to identify the culprit
and their methods.
Solution
Issue Identification
Issue
Resolution
Issue Prevention
This error was easily detected with a RAS
Data Audit. The issue was identified within the first
3 days of the audit's activities and the Council was immediately
alerted. Furthermore, a RAS
Monitor solution will enable the Council to check
the status of such data on a daily basis if required.
Such checks would not only identify potential data deletion,
but would highlight any data changed in any of the records,
enabling the Council to validate the integrity of any
changes, providing the early warning and information necessary
to catch those making inappropriate changes, for what
ever motive.
In this instance it was not possible for RAS to restore
the missing data, but in reality the resolution required
was to prevent future data loss or inappropriate amendment
of records. To prevent such inappropriate changes the solution
requires changes to both Council policy and the application
used.
Even after such changes are introduced, a RAS
Monitor solution is required to prove that such changes
are effective over the longer term.
To prevent such issues the priority activity is on its
early identification, using a RAS Monitor solution. Effective
and regular back-up procedures enable data lost (whether
accidental or deliberate) to be restored quickly, but key
to this is to first identify that data is lost.